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(1)
 tanya@iseg.utl.pt   
(2)
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Abstract 
This paper investigates the dynamics of stocks in the S&P500 index for the last 30 years. Using 
a stochastic geometry technique, we investigate the evolution of the market space and define a new 
measure for that purpose, which is a robust index of the dynamics of the market structure and 
provides information on the intensity and the sectoral impact of the crises. With this measure, we 
analyze the effects of some extreme phenomena on the geometry of the market. Nine crashes 
between 1987 and 2001 are compared by looking at the way they modify the shape of the manifold 
that describes the S&P500 market space. 
 
Keywords: financial markets, stochastic geometry, complexity, market spaces, market 
structures. 
JEL C0, G1 
1 Introduction 
 
In 1999, R. Mantegna [1] defined a distance metric based on correlation coefficients 
between the log-price difference of a pair of market securities. This metric allows for 
determining a distance between stocks evolving in time in a synchronous fashion. Since 
the metric was further discussed by Mantegna and Stanley [2] in the book that coined the 
term “Econophysics”, it has been applied in a considerable number of research works ([3]-
[11]). The fact that the metric is a properly defined distance gives a meaning to geometric 
notions in the study of the market. As Mantegna did when the distance was first introduced 
[1], many papers using the metric follow a topological approach.  
Provided that a distance between stocks exists, it is sufficient to form an additional 
hypothesis on the topological space of the stocks (as for example, choosing the 
subdominant ultrametric space, which is obtained from the minimal-spanning tree that 
links the stocks [2]) in order to end up with a connectivity pattern for the stocks. In so 
doing, one can naturally move away from a situation in which all the stocks were 
connected to a network of stocks, in which the connectivity pattern was endogenously 
determined. From the topological point of view, it opens a large set of promising 
possibilities to explore.  
Using Mantegna’s metric we followed a different perspective. In a previous 
contribution [12] we developed a method for the reconstruction of an economic space. By 
using a stochastic geometry technique, we proved that economic spaces are low-
dimensional entities and that this low-dimensionality is caused by the small proportion of 
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2 
systematic information present in correlations among stocks. Using our reconstruction 
method we found that part of the correlation contribution is virtually indistinguishable 
from random and surrogate data (obtained by independent time permutation for each 
stock) 
In the present paper, we investigated the hypothesis that market spaces uniformly 
contract during crashes along their effective dimensions and concluded that, otherwise, 
some crashes may act differently on specific directions, causing interesting changes in the 
shape of the market space. In order to capture that distortion effect a structure index is used 
to compute the lack of uniformity among the market effective dimensions. As a 
consequence, we are able to characterize the structures that emerge in relevant historical 
periods and to identify the economic sectors that are associated to important changes in the 
leading directions of the evolving market space. 
It is empirically observed that both during expansion and normal periods the market 
tends toward randomness whereas in the disturbed periods its structure is reinforced, not 
only in the topological sense (as revealed by the clustering measures) but also in the 
geometrical sense, considering distortions of form. From this observation we propose a 
new measure of the dynamics of the market structure, which captures that distortion effect 
in the shape of the market space. 
Some other authors also discussed the existence of a dynamic pattern during market's 
crashes ([10], [13]-[20]).  Sornette and his co-authors successfully demonstrated that some 
dynamic patterns can often be found in preceding events. For several extreme phenomena, 
they found evidence of incoming instabilities in the precursory patterns of time trajectories 
of market data (as price, volume and volatility variables). Among their main contributions, 
there is an issue that appears to be crucial for understanding the behavior of the market: the 
identification of distinct signature for endogenous and exogenous shocks originating 
crashes. In particular, they proved a systematic association of large events with positive 
feedback processes. Later in the paper we shall address that issue while applying our 
structure index to discriminate distinct processes at work in the S&P500 stock market. 
The identification of economic sectors as clusters of stocks with a similar economic 
dynamics was discussed in references [9] to [11]. In reference [9], Gopikrishnan et al used 
techniques that are related to the metric we use, although under a different perspective. 
Diagonalizing the correlation matrix, they have tried to identify particular eigenvectors 
with the traditional industrial sectors. In our analysis, the effective dimensions of a market 
space may not correspond to economic sectors. We argue that the lack of uniformity 
among the effective dimensions reveals the existence of a dynamic pattern (which we 
empirically verify to correspond to crashes). To evaluate the impact of those extreme 
phenomena in different economic sectors (and the sectoral dynamics among different 
crashes), we compute the index of market structure for different market spaces, each of 
them comprising stocks that belong to a specific economic sector. 
The fact that the correlation matrix changes in crash periods has also been shown by 
Onnela et al [13], [14] and [18]. With the use of clustering techniques, they discussed the 
occurrence of changes in the stock market from a topological perspective. From the 
minimal-spanning tree that links the stocks they showed that, during a market crisis, there 
may be (as in Black Monday) a topological shrinking of the tree.   
However, less important market crashes can not be observed from the correlation 
matrix itself. While extreme events like Black Monday are captured through changes in the 
correlation matrix, those with a smaller impact in the market synchronous behavior require 
a fine grain approach in order to be identified.  
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3 
In our method, after using the correlation matrix to prove that economic spaces are low-
dimensional entities (see also reference [12]), we focus on the geometrical aspects of those 
reduced spaces and show the impact of market crashes along the dimensions that carry the 
systematic information related to the market correlation structure. During a crash, the 
specific directions corresponding to the effective dimensions of a market space are 
differently affected, causing changes in the space shape. Experimentally, we observe that 
in the disturbed periods the market space increases its structured evolution, not only in the 
topological sense (as revealed by the clustering measures) but also in the geometrical 
sense, generating distortions of form. 
In sections 2 and 3 the method is explained in detail and it is applied to a set of 
companies that are or have been in the S&P500 index. In section 4 we discuss the results 
obtained for specific sectors and the role of those sectors in some important market 
crashes. Finally, a summary and conclusions are presented. 
2 Method 
 
The idea is simply stated in the following terms: 
1) Pick a representative set of N stocks and their historical data of returns over some 
time interval.  
2) From the returns data, using an appropriate metric, compute the matrix of 
distances between the N stocks.  
The problem now is reduced to an embedding problem in which, given a set of 
distances between points, one asks what is the smallest manifold that contains the set. 
Given a graph G and an allowed distortion there are algorithmic techniques [24] to map the 
graph vertices to a normed space in such a way that distances between the vertices of G 
match the distances between their geometric images, up to the allowed distortion. 
However, these techniques are not directly applicable to our problem because in the 
distances between assets, computed from their return fluctuations, there are systematic and 
unsystematic contributions. Therefore, to extract factor information from the market, we 
have somehow to separate these two effects. The following stochastic geometry1 technique 
is used: 
3) From the matrix of distances compute the coordinates for the N stocks in an 
Euclidean space of dimension smaller than N. 
4) Apply the standard analysis of reduction of the coordinates to the center of mass2 
and compute the eigenvectors of the inertial tensor. 
5) Apply the same technique to surrogate data, namely to data obtained by 
independent time permutation for each stock3.   
                                                 
1 Stochastic Geometry concerns the study of random geometric structures. References [26] and [27] 
provide detailed information on the subject. 
2 The concept of the center of mass is that of an average of the masses of the components of a object 
multiplied by their distances from a reference point. It is also called the centroid or center of gravity, 
corresponding to the point of a body (or object) at which the force of gravity can be considered to act 
and which undergoes no internal motion. It is a point at which the object's mass can be assumed to 
be concentrated 
3 Surrogate data is generated by permuting data (one-day return) of each stock randomly in time. As 
each stock is independently permuted, time correlations among stocks disappear while the resulting 
surrogate data preserve the mean and the variance that characterize actual data.  
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4 
6) Compare the eigenvalues in (4) with those in (5) and identify the directions for 
which the eigenvalues are significantly different as being the market characteristic 
dimensions. 
In so doing, we are attempting to identify the empirically constructed variables that 
drive the market and the number of surviving eigenvalues is the effective dimension of this 
economic space.  
7) From the eigenvalues of order smaller than the number of characteristic 
dimensions, compute the difference between eigenvalues in (4) with those in (5). The 
normalized sum of those differences is the index S, which measures the evolution of the 
distortion effect in the shape of the market space. 
For both surrogate and actual data, the sorted eigenvalues, from large to small, decrease 
with their order. In the surrogate case, the amount of decrease is linear in the order 
number, proving that the directions are being extracted from a spherical configuration. The 
display of a uniform and smooth decrease in the values of the sorted eigenvalues is 
characteristic of random cases and is also experimentally observed when the market space 
is built from historical data corresponding to a period of business as usual.  
Considering for the lack of uniformity among the market effective dimensions we are 
able to characterize the extent to which crashes act differently on specific directions, 
causing changes in the shape of the market space. Looking for relevant distortions in the 
shape of the S&P500 market space through the last 30 years, we found that amongst the 
highest values of the index are those computed in some important dates, as 19th October 
1987, 27th October 1997 and 11th September 2001.  
In addition to the geometrical analysis of the whole S&P500 market space, our measure 
is applied to sets of stocks that belong to specific economic sectors. Results show that 
some crashes act differently on specific sectors and that the deviation from random 
behavior may be limited to a few days after the day of the crash and also to a small number 
of sector-oriented groups of stocks. 
3 Measures 
 
From the returns )(kr  for each stock 
))(log())(log()(
1
kpkpkr
tt −
−=                     (1) 
 
a normalized vector  






−
−
=
2
2 )()(
)()(
)(
krkrn
krkr
kρ       (2) 
 
is defined, where n is the number of components (number of time labels) in the vector 
)(kρ . With this vector one defines the distance between the stocks k and l by the 
Euclidian distance of the normalized vectors.  
 
)()()1(2 lkCd ijij ρρ −=−=                   (3) 
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5 
 
as proposed in [1], with ijC  being the correlation coefficient of the returns )(ir , )( jr . 
The fact that ijd  is a properly defined distance gives a meaning to geometric notions and 
geometric tools in the study of the market. 
Given that set of distances between points, the question now is reduced to an 
embedding problem: one asks what is the smallest manifold that contains the set. If the 
proportion of systematic information present in correlations between stocks is small, then 
the corresponding manifold will be a low-dimensional entity. The following stochastic 
geometry technique was used for this purpose. 
3.1 The stochastic geometry technique 
 
After the distances ( ijd ) are calculated for the set of N stocks, they are embedded in 
Dℜ , where 1−≤ ND , with coordinates { })(kx . The center of mass R  is computed and 
coordinates reduced to the center of mass. 
k
kx
R
k∑
=
)(
                                    (4) 
Rkxky −= )()(             (5) 
and the inertial tensor 
        )()( kykyT j
k
iij ∑=                             (6) 
is diagonalized to obtain the set of normalized eigenvectors { ii e,λ }. The eigenvectors 
ie define the characteristic directions of the set of stocks. The characteristic directions 
correspond to the eigenvalues ( iλ ) that are clearly different from those obtained from 
surrogate data. They define a reduced subspace of dimension d, which carries the 
systematic information related to the market correlation structure [12]. In order to improve 
the decision criterion on how many eigenvalues are clearly different from those obtained 
from surrogate data, a normalized difference τ is computed: 
  
       )('1)()( iii λλτ −+=                (7) 
 
and the significantly different eigenvalues are those to which  τ(i) > 1/2. 
3.2 Index of the market structure 
 
Since the largest d eigenvalues define the effective dimensionality of the economic 
space, at time t, we compute S as: 
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6 
1
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ii
S λ
λ
λ
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                 (8) 
 
where λ t(1), λ t(2), ..., λt(d) are the largest d eigenvalues of the market space and λt'(1), 
λ t'(2), ... λ t'(d) are the largest d eigenvalues obtained from surrogate data, namely from 
data obtained by independent time permutation of each stock. In computing S, at a given 
time t, both  λ t and λ t' are obtained over the same time window and for the same set of 
stocks.  
Vilela Mendes proposed in [16] an index that quantifies the effect of some structure-
generating mechanisms in dynamical models, based on the fact that a structure in a 
collective system acquires a characteristic length larger than that of the individual 
components of the system. We develop this strategy for the definition of our structure 
index S: as the dynamics of systems develop a structure-generating mechanism, the index 
S measures the normalized difference between the characteristic size of those structures 
and the characteristic size of the individual components of the system. This is a 
geometrical approach to define and to measure emergence. 
In portfolio optimization models, when the systematic and unsystematic contributions 
to the portfolio risk are distinguished, the former is associated to the correlation between 
stocks (collective structure) and the later to the individual variances of each stock [12]. 
Consequently, when S is applied to the market space, the eigenvalues obtained from 
surrogate data (λ t') may be taken as reference values that represent the characteristic size 
with which each leading direction contributes to the shape of a market whose components 
were uncorrelated. These eigenvalues correspond to the characteristic size of the individual 
(isolated) components of the market. On the other hand, the eigenvalues obtained from 
actual data (λ t) represent the characteristic size of each structure emerging from the 
dynamics of the market, that is, associated to each leading direction of the market space.  
Although the dynamical structure-generating mechanism in market spaces is not related 
to positive Lyapunov exponents as proposed in [16], the dynamical features we attempt to 
capture are those associated to changes occurring at the leading directions of the market 
space. As the eigenvalues obtained from actual data describe the structure emerging from 
the dynamics of the correlations between stocks, they may be taken as a measure of the 
collective structure of the market, being this structure generated by the dynamics of the 
market (i.e. by the synchronous behavior of stocks). 
4 Results and Discussion 
 
Results were computed in relation to actual daily returns data as well as to surrogate 
data that are generated by permuting each stock (one-day return data) randomly in time. As 
each stock is independently permuted, time correlations among stocks disappear while the 
resulting surrogate data preserve the mean and the variance that characterize actual data. 
4.1 The S&P500 effective dimensions 
 
The first set of actual data consists in 249 stocks present in S&P500 from July 1973 to 
March 2003, considering all the surviving firms for the whole period. Part of the ordered 
eigenvalue distributions obtained from actual data and surrogate data is shown in Fig.1. 
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Figure 1: S&P500 249-stocks: decrease of the largest 25 eigenvalues 
 
The plots in Fig.1 represent the largest 25 eigenvalues obtained for the first set of actual 
data. The largest 25 eigenvalues are compared to the largest 25 eigenvalues obtained from 
surrogate data. In the lower plot, the comparison between actual and surrogate data is 
emphasized by computing their normalized difference τ (equation (7)). 
Given the decrease obtained from the seventh eigenvalue, we conclude that the market 
structure is essentially confined to a six-dimensional subspace. This proves that this 
subspace captures the structure of the deterministic correlations that are driving the market 
and that the remainder of the market space may be considered, for the current purpose, as 
being generated by random fluctuations.  
To test the robustness of this conclusion, we have divided the data in two 
chronologically successive batches (the first consisting in daily data from July 1973 to 
March 1988, while the second batch includes data from March 1988 to March 2003) and 
performed the same operations. In spite of the changes in the market through time, in both 
cases the behavior of the eigenvalues distribution is very much the same.  
Apart from statistical fluctuations, the reconstructed spaces exhibit a reasonable degree 
of stability, confirming that the number of characteristic dimensions of the S&P500 market 
space is six. Considering this result, our analysis of the S&P500 market shape is based on 
six-dimensional subspaces. The question now is to assess the extent to which the 
occurrence of extreme phenomena modifies the shape of this subspace and the pattern of 
behavior of firms and sectors. 
4.2 The dynamics of crashes 
 
As extreme phenomena are dated events and as we look for their consequences in the 
distributions of the six leading directions, the geometry of the historical data is defined 
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8 
considering short periods. In this sense, instead of the large time intervals that defined the 
reconstruction of the S&P500 space as in [12], we adopted a 16-days window as the 
chosen time interval and computed the index of structure with the time window centered at 
several different dates.  
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Figure 2: S&P500 deviation from randomness at different dates,  
comparing crises and a business-as-usual day (6th May 1997) 
 
The plots in Figure 2 show some of these dates, namely the crashes of 19th October 
1987, the Black Monday, 11th September 2001 and 27th October 1997, the Second Black 
Monday. The second plot in this figure shows an unimportant date: May 6, 1997, as 
suggested in reference [11], was a typical normal day in the US stock market.  
The plots in figure 2 show λ(i) (with i=1,…,6) obtained from the S&P500 market space 
at four different dates. It is obvious that the values of S obtained for the first and the 
second Black Mondays and for 11th September 2001 are high, as there is a great difference 
in the decrease of the first six eigenvalues computed from actual and surrogate data.  
On the contrary, when the same calculation is performed around a typical normal date, 
the results show that, comparing actual data with surrogate data, there is a quite small 
difference in the decrease of the first six eigenvalues, which is still another piece of 
evidence for the robustness of our method. 
The geometrical changes in the shape of the market space describe the structural 
evolution of the characteristic dimensions. As previously indicated, the normal periods 
qualitatively tend to randomness while the disturbed periods will tend away from 
randomness. The null hypothesis for calculating S would state that, independently on the 
period (normal or disturbed) around which the index is computed, the decrease of the first 
six eigenvalues is equivalent to the one obtained from uncorrelated data (with the same 
mean, distribution and variance of the actual data and being S calculated using the same 
time window in both situations). 
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9 
A less detailed but more extensive result is presented in Fig.3, where the plot shows the 
daily values of S for the 30 years period. We used a time moving window of 16 days on a 
market space including the 249 stocks, i.e. all firms surviving through the whole period. 
The eight highest values of S are marked on the plot.   
 
17/04/71 07/10/76 30/03/82 20/09/87 12/03/93 02/09/98 23/02/04
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
249 stocks
S
Oct97
Oct98
Sep01
Dec00
Oct89
Oct87
Apr01Apr99
 
Figure 3: the evolution of the index S, measuring the evolution of the S&P500 structure 
 
The highest peaks are identified and correspond to the following crashes: 
 
1. October 1987 
2. October 1989 
3. October 1997 
4. October 1998 
5. April 1999 
6. Dec.2000/Jan.2001 
7. April 2001 
8. September 2001 
 
The ranking of the crashes according to the measure of S and its explanation is as 
follows: 
 
1. October 1987: Black Monday. 
2. December 2000-Jan.2001: Argentinean Financial crisis (Argentina and Turkey 
bond market sell-off). 
3. October 1989: the US stock market falls almost 7%. 
4. September 2001: attack to the Twin Towers. 
5. April 1999: Nikkei Crash (Japan). 
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10 
6. March/April 2001: according to the NBER a recession began in the US in March 
2001. 
7. October 1998: Russian Crash. 
8. October 1997: Asian Crash, the Second Black Monday. 
 
It is quite obvious from Fig 3 that we have two periods of crises, clustering in 1987-
1989 and in 1997-2001: the nature of these periods is discussed below. It should also be 
considered that some of the events in the list refer to crises in emergent market countries, 
with considerable effects on the dynamics of the world economy; others refer to the effect 
of different factors.  Indeed, the nature of the triggering factors widely varies. The 1987 
crash is well researched and corresponds to a major malfunctioning of the financial 
system. As Wright points out [25], the Dow Jones suffered a major loss of 22,61% the 19th 
October 1987, whereas the losses were 12,82% the 28th October 1929 and 11,73% the 29th. 
Considering the 55 days around the trough, the cumulated loss was of 39,6% in 1929 and 
of 36,1% in 1987.  
Having identified the events corresponding to the eight highest values (peaks) of S in 
the last 30 years (Fig.3), we reconsidered our data investigating the periods around each 
peak. Besides providing a more accurate view of the evolution, it allows for a better 
measurement since at each window we consider a larger number of companies in the 
S&P500. For the purpose of comparison, the first plot in Fig.4 shows the behavior of S in 
the nearby of the highest peak compared to the values of S around a typical normal day in 
the US stock market.  
20/10 25/10 30/10 04/11 09/11 14/11 19/11 24/11
0
10
20
30
40
312 stocks               Oct 1987
S
20/04 25/04 30/04 05/05 10/05 15/05 20/05 25/05
0
10
20
30
40
406 stocks               May 1997
S
 
Figure 4: The Black Monday and a day of business-as-usual 
 
Considering shorter spans of time, we could include larger sets of stocks for each 
period; consequently, all the entrant firms at each period can be taken into our picture. This 
procedure highlighted the importance of another crash, which was previously hidden by 
our selection of the thirty years’ survivors. In fact, when the window used for scanning 
through our data is 40 days, the highest peaks (SMax= max{St}  ti ≤ t ≤ ti+40 ) organize in 
the following order (Table 1):  
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11 
 
Ranking 
 
Date (T) 
 
SMax 
Number of 
Stocks 
included 
1 October 1987 37.7 312 
2 Dec.2000/Jan.2001 16.2 426 
3 October 1989 11.3 330 
4 Mar/April 2001 8.5 426 
5 April 2000          
(NASDAQ) 
8.6 424 
6 April 1999 8.1 417 
7 October 1997 7.1 408 
8 October 1998 6.4 414 
9 September 2001 6.3 426 
Table 1: Ranking of the crises according to the values of SMax 
 
Unsurprisingly, the highest peak corresponds to the Black Monday, being not only the 
larger one but also the long-lasting crisis. The most interesting change in the ranking of 
crashes concerns the appearance of the NASDAQ collapse in April 2000, which was 
hidden by the fact that some emerging firms in the nineties were not considered in our 
previous data set since they did not exist for the whole (30 years) period. Yet, when they 
are considered, the real picture of a turbulent market appears very clearly: it was in the 
Information Technology and Telecommunication sector that most speculation and stock 
activity concentrated in the late nineties, during the Internet bubble, and the NASDAQ 
crash marks its end. This crash proves the dimension of this speculative process. The 
NASDAQ attained its highest peak by early March 2000, and then its all-time highest loss 
by April (35% of loss in relation to the peak the previous month). 
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Figure 5: The crises of 1997, 1998, 1999 and  September 2001  
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Figure 6: 1989, 2000 and 2001 Crises 
 
In order to check the predictive character of our structure index a smaller time interval 
(10-days window) was chosen for the computation of S. The idea was to better observe the 
behaviour of S before the window hits the specific day of the crash, mainly in 19th October 
1987 and 27th October 1997. It is remarkable that the behaviour of S remains almost 
unchangeable before the 10-days window hits the day of the crash and after leaving the 
region comprised in that time interval. 
In the next section, sectoral dynamics is taken into account showing that some crises 
tend to concentrate in some specific sectors, while other crises tend to exhibit a pattern of 
perturbation in all sectors. 
4.3 Compared sectoral dynamics 
 
When, instead of the whole set of stocks, we consider sub-sets including the stocks of 
firms belonging to the same economic sector 4 and compute the index of market structure 
for each of these sub-sets, evidence for some interesting properties emerges.  
In a previous paper and using several topological indexes [12], we verified that in 
periods of expansion, sector-oriented sub-sets are characterized by a smaller average 
distance between stocks. The average behavior of companies belonging to the same 
economic sector is more synchronous than the behavior of the overall market taken as a 
whole: in the jungle of the crisis, tribes of firms act together. Now we analyze sectoral 
dynamics by considering the consequences of crashes on the leading directions of nine 
sector-oriented market spaces, being each of them restricted to stocks in one of the 
following sectors: Energy, Materials, Industry, Consumer Discretionary, Consumer 
Staples, Health Care, Financials, Information Technology and Utilities. 
                                                 
4 Detailed structures of sectors and other information from Global Industry Classification Standard 
(GICS®), available at  http://www.standardandpoors.com/, referenced in June, 2005. 
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13 
In Figs.7 to 9, the histograms show the value of SMax obtained from those nine different 
market spaces, all of them built on the same time period, which is indicated in the title of 
the plots. The results show the remarkable impact of the Asian crisis in the Financial sector 
and the strong effect of the attack to the Twin Towers on the Materials and Industrial 
sectors. 
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Figure 7: Asian Crash 
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Figure 8: September 11th 
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From the plots in figures 7, 8 and 9 we see that some crises tend to concentrate in a few 
specific sectors (financial companies for the Asian Crash, industrial, materials and 
financial companies for the case of the reaction to the 11th September). In contrast, the 
Black Monday crisis exhibits a pattern of perturbation in all sectors (as Fig. 9 shows). 
The plot in Fig.9 shows the extraordinarily unique character of the 1987 Black Monday: 
this is the only case of a crash provoking a similar dynamics in all major sectors, whereas 
in all other crises the dynamics and time pattern of the main sectors is clearly divergent.  
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Figure 9: Black Monday 
 
The following table summarizes the sectoral pattern of the crashes, indicating the 
sectors leading the structural change: 
 
Date Leading Sectors 
October 1987 Black Monday All 
January 2001 Argentinean 
Crisis 
Financials 
October 1989 US stock market Consumer Staples/Financials 
September 2001  Twin Towers Industrials/Materials/Financials 
April 2000 NASDAQ Information Technology (IT) 
October 1998 Russian Crash Energy/Utilities 
April 1999 Nikkei Crash Consumer Discretionary 
April 2001 US recession Energy/IT 
October 1997 Asian Crash Financials 
Table 2: description of the sectors dominating each crash 
 
From the above results, one notices that the Financials sector is the sector that most 
frequently appears as a leading sector. Its appearance as the leading sector of both the 
Argentinean and the Asian crises is in accordance with the appropriate expectations, since 
each of these crises corresponds to a major malfunctioning of the financial system. 
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15 
Another encouraging result refers to the Information Technology leadership at the 
NASDAQ crisis, settling the end of the Internet Bubble of the second half of the nineties. 
Finally, we compare the sectoral dynamics among different crashes, taking the 
examples of Materials and Financials. Because in the Black Monday crisis the index S 
reaches very high values in all sectors, this crisis was intentionally excluded from the plots 
in Fig.10. 
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Figure 10: Materials and Financials dynamics 
 
Back to the geometrical tale of our index, a three-dimensional look at the market space 
that evolves from October 1989 to September 2001 and comprises on average 80 Financial 
stocks (the lower plot in Fig.10), would reveal a manifold that: (i) starts from a elliptical 
form (in 1989), (ii) acquires prominences in a particular direction at the 1997 Asian Crash, 
and (iii) turns back to a close-to-spherical form until the Argentinean Financial crisis in 
December 2000. After a partial shape recovery, a new relevant distortion will arrive in 
September, 2001.  
A smoother dynamics characterizes the market space built from stocks in the Materials 
sector along the same time period (1989 to 2001). Accordingly to the results presented 
above (the upper plot in Fig.10), the only relevant shape distortion of that market space is 
the one taking place in 11th September, 2001; when the structure index S reaches a value 
three times higher than the highest value obtained so far for the Materials market space. 
 
5 Conclusions 
 
A stochastic geometry technique proved to be useful for the purpose of describing and 
interpreting the evolution and changes in the dynamics of a market. Furthermore, the index 
S, as defined in this paper, allowed for a useful taxonomy of the nine major stock market 
crises occurring in the last thirty years. The measure of SMax proved to be useful and 
capable of discriminating among the distinct processes at work in the stock market. 
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16 
As the index S captures the lack of uniformity among the market effective dimensions, 
we are able to characterize the extent to which crashes act differently on specific 
directions, causing changes in the shape of the market space. Looking for relevant 
distortions in the shape of the S&P500 market space through the last 30 years, we 
identified the events corresponding to crises in emergent market countries, with 
considerable effects on the dynamics of the world economy. Others events that were also 
identified refer to the effect of different factors, showing that, the nature of the triggering 
factors widely varies. 
The identification of the characteristics of each crisis allows for their differentiation. 
Some crises were imposed either by disarrangements of national stock markets from 
emerging economies (Russia, Asia) and global players (Japan) or by purely exogenous 
factors (the 11th September attack). The crash provoked by exogenous factors is less 
consequential and is rapidly superseded. Instead, the Black Monday crisis followed another 
pattern: it is deeper, longer and involve a large number of sectors. The Argentinean crises 
(December 2000-January 2001) and the following NASDAQ crisis (April 2000) and the 
US recession (April 2001) initiated or followed the end of the Internet Bubble of the 
second half of the nineties.  
The Black Monday (1987) was the deeper and the longest of all the crashes as well as 
the more general, since it involved all economic sectors. The data suggest that another 
structural crisis may be at work in the clustering of six crashes between April 1997 and 
September 2001. 
Finally, we proved evidence of the existence of structure in the financial market 
dynamics and, furthermore, of relevant changes in structure, mostly in periods of crises 
and crashes. Considering this evidence, the predictive character of our structure index is to 
be explored in future work. 
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